

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 02831 03 OF 05 080115 Z

67

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01

GAC-01 TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 SS-15 NSC-10 ACDA-19

IO-13 OMB-01 EB-11 RSR-01 /136 W
----- 023375

O P 072215 Z JUN 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 441

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY 3053

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY MADRID

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 USNATO 2831

ALTHOUGH WE MAY QUESTION THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO'S DEFENSE IN THE CENTER REGION, THE RATIO OF FORCES DEPLOYED THERE DOES NOT PUT US AT ANY GREAT DISADVANTAGE. THE PACT ORDER OF BATTLE CONTAINS 58 STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS DIVISIONS IN THE CENTER REGION WEST OF THE USSR (NOT INCLUDING HUNGARY), COMPARED WITH ONLY 29 1/3 DIVISIONS AND 12 BRIGADES IN A COMPARABLE AREA ON THE NATO SIDE (INCLUDING DENMARK AND FRANCE). HOWEVER. PACT DIVISIONS, EVEN AT FULL STRENGTH, ARE SUBSTANTIALLY SMALLER THAN THEIR NATO COUNTERPARTS. WHEN WE COUNT MEN IN COMBAT AND SUPPORT UNITS INSTEAD OF ADDING UP DIVISIONS, WE FIND THAT THE PACT DEPLOYS ABOUT 730,000 MEN, WHILE NATO FIELDS AROUND 685,000 IN A COMPARABLE AREA.

DEPENDING UPON WHAT IS BEING COUNTED, THE PACT HAS NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN TANKS (14,500 TO 6,100) AND TOTAL AIRCRAFT (2,800 TO 2,750). BUT NATO POSSESSES IMPORTANT QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ADVANTAGES IN TANK DESTROYERS, ANTI- TANK WEAPONS, ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, TRUCKS, LOGISTIC SUPPORT, AND-- MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL- MODERN OFFENSIVE AIRCRAFT.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02831 03 OF 05 080115 Z

IT IS WORTH NOTING, MOREOVER, THAT NATO PAYS MORE FOR ITS DEPLOYED FORCES THAN THE PACT, QUITE INDEPENDENTLY OF MANPOWER COSTS. IF WE ARE NOT OBTAINING A LEVEL OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AT LEAST COMMENSURATE WITH THAT OF THE PACT, WE SHOULD CERTAINLY

FIND OUT WHY. THE RESOURCES FOR A POWERFUL NON- NUCLEAR DEFENSE AT M- DAY HAVE BEEN FOR THE MOST PART MADE AVAILABLE.

THIS SITUATION OF ROUGH PARITY AT M- DAY DOES NOT CHANGE SIGNIFICANTLY EVEN IF PACT MOBILIZATION BEGINS A WEEK BEFORE THAT OF NATO AND WHAT WE CONSIDER THE FULL PACT THREAT IS DEPLOYED TO THE CENTER REGION. WE ESTIMATE THAT ON THAT DATE (NATO M- PLUS-23) THE PACT COULD MUSTER GROUND FORCES TOTALING ABOUT 1.3 MILLION MEN IN 90 DIVISION FORCES, ALONG WITH ABOUT 23,000 TANKS AND 3,700 AIRCRAFT, OF WHICH A LARGE PERCENTAGE WOULD CONSIST OF SHORT- RANGE, LOW- PAYLOAD INTERCEPTORS.

BY M- PLUS-23, NATO COULD DEPLOY GROUND FORCES OF 1.8 MILLION MEN IN 36 DIVISION AND 30 BRIGADE FORCES (INCLUDING 6 FRENCH DIVISIONS), AS WELL AS 7,900 TANKS (WITH MORE IN STORAGE) AND ABOUT 3,600 AIRCRAFT CONTAINING A PREPONDERANCE OF FIGHTER BOMBERS. AFTER M- PLUS-23 THE STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE WOULD INCREASE STILL FURTHER RELATIVE TO THE PACT AS ADDITIONAL REINFORCEMENTS AND SUPPLIES ARRIVED FROM THE UNITED STATES.

I DO NOT WANT TO PRETEND THAT THESE QUITE AGGREGATE COMPARISONS RELIABLY FORECAST THE OUTCOME OF A NON- NUCLEAR CONFLICT IN THE CENTER REGION. OTHER FACTORS IN ADDITION TO THE NUMERICAL FORCE BALANCE WILL HEAVILY INFLUENCE THE RESULT. IN FACT, IT IS PRECISELY IN THESE LESS VISIBLE AREAS THAT NATO' S WEAKNESSES ARE GREATEST. WE CONTINUE TO HAVE PROBLEMS WITH OUR COMMAND- AND- CONTROL. MANY OF OUR HIGH- COST AIRCRAFT REMAIN VULNERABLE ON THE GROUND. WE LACK SUFFICIENT WAR RESERVE STOCKS TO OUTLAST THE PACT. WE STILL SUFFER FROM MALDEPLOYMENTS AND EXCESSIVE REDUNDANCY IN OUR LOGISTICAL SYSTEMS. OUR TACTICS APPEAR TO STEM MORE FROM INTERNAL DOCTRINES THAN EXTERNAL TREATS.

BUT IN THE COURSE OF RECOGNIZING OUR OWN WEAKNESSES (AS WE MUST) WE SHOULD NOT OVERLOOK THE MANY PROBLEMS FACED BY THE USSR AND ITS POSSIBLY RELUCTANT ALLIES. IF THEY ATTACK, THEY MUST CROSS A MORE DIFFICULT TERRAIN THAN WE GENERALLY CONCEDE. THEY SUFFER FROM SERIOUS LOGISTIC DEFICIENCIES AND VULNERABILITIES OF THEIR OWN. THEIR CONVENTIONAL AIRPOWER IS CRITICAL TO BUT INADEQUATE FOR THE KIND OF CAMPAIGN THE SOVIET MARSHALS SEEM TO PREFER. THE SUCCESS OF THEIR STRATEGY-- TO THE EXTENT THAT

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02831 03 OF 05 080115 Z

WE UNDERSTAND IT, ALSO TURNS ON A SECOND ECHELON OF GROUND FORCES DRAWN FROM THE USSR, THE BULK OF WHICH WOULD HAVE TO DEPEND ON RESERVE CALL- UPS TO REACH COMBAT STRENGTH. AND THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES MUST ENTERTAIN SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE RELIABILITY OF THEIR ALLIES AND THE SECURITY OF THEIR LINES OF COMMUNICATION FROM INTERNAL THREATS.

THE RESULT OF OUR ANALYSIS MUST, IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, BE SOMEWHAT PARADOXICAL. ON THE ONE HAND SACEUR, QUITE UNDERSTANDABLY, CANNOT ASSURE US OF BEING ABLE TO WITHSTAND A HEAVY FAST- MOVING PACT ASSULT ON HIS CENTRAL FRONT. ON THE OTHER HAND, A PRUDENT SOVIET CALCULATOR CANNOT ASSURE HIS LEADERS OF THE PACT' S ABILITY TO BREAK THROUGH NATO' S FORWARD DEFENSES.

5. SUMMARY. TO SUM UP, DESPITE IMPORTANT ASYMMETRIES BETWEEN THE FORCES OF NATO AND THE PACT, IT DOES NOT APPEAR AS THOUGH NATO NEED LABOR UNDER ANY SERIOUS DISADVANTAGES ON M- DAY OR M- PLUS-23 WITH APPROXIMATELY ITS EXISTING NON- NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE-- PROVIDED ALWAYS THAT A NUMBER OF ITS LESS VISIBLE WEAKNESSES ARE REMOVED. NOR IS IT CLEAR WHY THE DEFICIENCIES THAT DO EXIST CANNOT BE REMEDIED AT RELATIVELY MODEST INCREMENTAL COST.

THE REAL ISSUES, IN OTHER WORDS, HAVE LITTLE TO DO WITH WHETHER WE CAN DESIGN AN EFFECTIVE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE. WE ALREADY POSSESS THE INGREDIENTS OF SUCH A DEFENSE AND ARE PAYING A CONSIDERABLE PRICE FOR THEM. HOW WE NOW DEAL WITH THE RESULTING POSTURE REST PRIMARILY IN YOUR HANDS. THE UNITED STATES SIMPLY CANNOT GO IT ALONE IN SUPPORTING THE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT; EUROPE MUST WANT IT AND STRIVE FOR IT TOO. INDEED, AND I AM SORRY TO SAY THIS, I DOUBT THAT OUR CONGRESS WILL LONG CONTINUE TO APPROPRIATE THE FUNDS FOR LARGE CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE IF THE US REMAINS THE ONLY CONSISTENTLY SERIOUS ADVOCATE OF NON- NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. CHANGE, IN SHORT, IS PRESSING VERY HARD ON US ALL.

ONE RESPONSE TO THE PRESSURE COULD BE TO ABANDON THE CONCEPT OF A FULL- SCALE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT IN FAVOR OF A GENUINE TRIPWIRE POSTURE, SMALLER FORCES, AND A MUCH LOWER NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. BUT TO THIS ADMINISTRATION, SUCH AN APPROACH IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE.

NOTHING PRECLUDES US FROM HAVING AN EFFECTIVE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT AND A HIGH NUCLEAR THRESHOLD; BOTH ARE WELL WITHIN OUR MEANS. ACCORDINGLY, THE US WISHES VERY MUCH TO SEE THE FULL
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 02831 03 OF 05 080115 Z

NON- NUCLEAR OPTION MORE WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTED AND THE POSTURE OF THE ALLIANCE TAILORED TO SUIT IT.

WHEN ALL IS SAID AND DONE, WE CERTAINLY REGARD THE RED ARMIES AS A MAJOR DETERRENT FORCE ON THE SIDE OF THE PACT. IT STANDS TO REASON THAT WE SHOULD TREAT OUR OWN NON- NUCLEAR DEFENSES IN THE SAME WAY. IF WE DO SO, WE CAN GIVE OUR CITIZENS INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN THESE MOST CRUCIAL BARRIERS TO CONFLICT. IF WE DO SO, WE CAN ALSO SET WORTHWHILE OBJECTIVES TO INSPIRE THE ALLIANCE AND LOOK FORWARD MORE HOPEFULLY TO A DECADE AND MORE OF PEACE.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 02831 04 OF 05 080059 Z

67

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01

GAC-01 TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 SS-15 NSC-10 ACDA-19

IO-13 OMB-01 EB-11 RSR-01 /136 W

----- 023243

O P 072215 Z JUN 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 442

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY 3054

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY MADRID

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 USNATO 2831

II. FORCE IMPROVEMENTS

" I RELATED EARLIER THIS MORNING THE POSITION OF MY GOVERNMENT ON THE NEED FOR QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS AND I EXPRESSED MY GOVERNMENT' S CONFIDENCE IN THE NATO STRATEGY AND ITS CONCERN THAT THAT STRATEGY HAS NOT BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED. I SAID THAT WE IN THE UNITED STATES WANT TO SEE THE NON- NUCLEAR OPTION MORE WHOLE- HEARTEDLY SUPPORTED AND THE POSTURE OF OUR ALLIANCE TAILORED TO SUIT IT. I STATED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT WE VIEW WITH CONCERN THE OFT- HEARD EXPRESSIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT IS BEYOND OUR REACH AND I CITED AT SOME LENGTH REASONS WHY WE IN NATO SHOULD HAVE ADUNDANT CONFIDENCE THAT WE HAVE THE BASIC INGREDIENTS OF A SUCESSFUL NON- NUCLEAR DEFENSE -- THAT A CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF THE DEFICIENCIES AND ASSETS OF BOTH SIDES SHOULD NOT LEAD US TO CONCLUDE THA NA EFFECTIVE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY IS HOPELESS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 02831 04 OF 05 080059 Z

AND BEYOND OUR REACH. ON THE CONTRARY, GIVEN CERTAIN BADLY NEEDED ACTIONS, IT IS WITHIN THE CAPABILITY OF THIS ALLIANCE TO BUILD AN EFFECTIVE CONVENTIONAL FORCE. WE MUST ALL BEAR IN MIND THAT, HOWEVER IM- PRESSIVE OUR BASIC INGREDIENTS MAY BE, WE HAVE NOT REALIZED THEIR FULL POTENTIAL. IT' S TIME THAT WE MOVE TO DO THIS.

" COMPLETION OF THE AD-70 PROGRAM IS OBVIOUSLY A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. AS WE DO SO, HOWEVER, WE MUST DECIDE ON THE LIST OF CRITICAL ITEMS NEEDED DURING THE EARLY PHASES OF THE CONFLICT AND SET OUR GOALS FOR SUCCESSIVE YEARS. THERE ARE MANY CANDI- DATES FOR THE LIST: I WILL ONLY MENTION FOUR OF THEM.

1. SHELTERS. MY FIRST CANDIDATE IS AIRCRAFT SHELTERS. ALL

OF US APPRECIATE THE LEADERSHIP OF THE EUROGROUP IN GETTING THIS PROGRAM UNDER WAY. NOW WE MUST BUILD SHELTERS FOR ALL EUROPEAN- BASED AIRCRAFT AND ALL US AIRCRAFT SCHEDULED FOR DEPLOYMENT BY M- PLUS-30. THESE SHELTERS COST ONLY A TENTH OF THE AIRCRAFT THEY ARE DESIGNED TO PROTECT. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT HARDLY MAKES SENSE TO ADD TO THE INVENTORY OF AIRCRAFT UNTIL WE CAN REDUCE THE VULNERABILITY OF THOSE WE ALREADY HAVE.

2. AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION. SECOND, WE MUST ASSURE THE MOST EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF OUR AIRCRAFT DURING THE EARLY DAYS OF A WAR. IF WE ARE TO BELIEVE SOVIET DOCTRINE, WE WILL FACE A SERIES OF FAST- MOVING ARMORED THRUSTS BY THE PACT DURING THE OPENING PHASES OF THE ATTACK. OUR TACTICAL AIR CAN PLAY A CRITICAL ROLE IN CONTAINING THESE THREATS, PROVIDED THAT WE EXERCISE CENTRALIZED COMMAND- AND- CONTROL OVER OUR ASSETS AND PRACTICE SERIOUS ECONOMY OF FORCE. CLEARLY WE MUST CONTINUE TO IMPROVE THE UTILIZATION OF THE COMBINED AIR FORCES AND ACQUIRE BOTH THE FACILITIES AND THE DOCTRINE TO ENSURE THEIR ALLOCATION TO WHERE THE OFFENSIVE PRESSURE IS GREATEST.

3. ANTI- TANK WEAPONS. THIRD, WE NEED TO TAKE COMPARABLE MEASURES ON THE GROUND TO BLUNT THE ENEMY TANK COLUMNS. PRIMARILY THIS MEANS INCREASING THE DENSITY OF OUR ONE- MAN AND TWO- MAN ANTI- TANK WEAPONS. BUT IT ALSO MEANS CLARIFYING THE PLANS AND DOCTRINES FOR THEIR USE.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 02831 04 OF 05 080059 Z

4. WAR RESERVES STOCKS. FINALLY, WE MUST CONTINUE TO BUILD BALANCED STOCKS OF WAR RESERVES MUNITIONS AND OTHER CONSUMABLES, ADDING BY INCREMENTS TO THE NUMBER OF DAYS OF SUPPLY THAT WE WILL MAINTAIN AT AGREED RATES OF CONSUMPTION. IT IS POINTLESS TO KEEP ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES SUFFICIENT FOR A CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE, YET DENY THEM THE ORDNANCE NECESSARY TO CONDUCT IT. WAR RESERVE STOCKS, PARTICULARLY OF THE NEWER NON- NUCLEAR MUNITIONS, MUST BE INCREASED TO LEVELS HIGHER THAN THE HOLDING OF THE PACT, WHICH WE ESTIMATE AT ABOUT 30 DAYS OF SUPPLY. WE SIMPLY CANNOT PERMIT OUR OWN FORCES TO RUN OUT OF AMMUNITION AND OTHER ESSENTIAL CONSUMABLES BEFORE THEIR ENEMIES DO.

III. BURDEN- SHARING

FORCE IMPROVEMENTS ARE AN IMPORTANT INGREDIENT OF HIGH CONFIDENCE IN NATO'S NON- NUCLEAR DETERRENT. US TACTICAL AIR AND GROUND FORCES-- BOTH THOSE DEPLOYED AND THOSE MAINTAINED IN THE US FOR REINFORCEMENT-- ARE STILL ANOTHER. IT IS TRUE, OF COURSE, THAT THE DEPLOYED US FORCES AMOUNT TO MORE THAN 25 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL ALLIED CAPABILITY CURRENTLY IN THE CENTER REGION. BUT THAT IS ONLY THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG. AFTER M- PLUS-23, AS INCREASED US REINFORCEMENTS COME ON LINE, OUR CONTRIBUTION RISES TO NEARLY 50 PERCENT OF THE CENTER REGION TOTAL.

THE ANNUAL BUDGETARY COSTS OF THIS CONTRIBUTION ARE SUBSTANTIAL, BUT WE ACCEPT THEM. WHAT IS TROUBLESOME, HOWEVER,

IS THAT WE SUFFER AN ADDITIONAL PENALTY FOR STATIONING A PART OF OUR CONTRINUTION ON THE FRONT LINE OF EUROPE. IF WE WERE TO BRING OUR DEPLOYED FORCES HOME, WE WOULD SAVE AROUND \$400 MILLION A YEAR IN BUDGETARY COSTS AND REDUCE OUR BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT BY OVER \$1.5 BILLION.

DO NOT MISUNDERSTAND ME: THE US REGARDS ITS PRESENCE IN EUROPE AND ITS CONTINUING SUPPORT OF NATO AS AN ESSENTIAL INVESTMENT IN DETERRENCE AND PEACE. WE DO NOT BEGRUDGE THE PRICE WE PAY FOR THE CONTRIBUTION WE MAKE. BUT MANY OF OUR PEOPLE NO LONGER SEE WHY THAT SHOULD SUFFER AN ADDITIONAL BURDEN FOR STATIONING A PART OF THE US CONTRIBUTION IN EUROPE. EVEN MORE URGENTLY, OUR CONGRESS HAS GROWN IMPATIENT WITH AN INCREMENTAL COST THAT HAS NOT APPARENT JUSTIFICATION IN THE CURRENT INTERPREATION OF NATO STRATEGY OR THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUR ALLIES.

IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, NATO MUST FOCUS ON THE ADDED COSTS OF OUR FORCES IN EUROPE. ALL OF US HERE NEED TO EXPLORE-- AND SOON-- HOW, ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS, WE CAN SHARE THESE COSTS.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 02831 04 OF 05 080059 Z

OTHERWISE THE PRESIDENT' S PLEDGE WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO FULFILL.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 02831 05 OF 05 080102 Z

67

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 CIAE-00

PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01

GAC-01 TRSE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 SS-15 NSC-10 ACDA-19

IO-13 OMB-01 EB-11 RSR-01 /136 W

----- 023335

O P 072215 Z JUN 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 443

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY 3055

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY MADRID

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 USNATO 2831

I REALIZE THAT WE CANNOT RESOLVE THE BURDEN- SHARING ISSUE HERE AND NOW. BUT I DO ASK THE MINISTERS DO DECIDE HOW THEY

WILL REAFFIRM THE PRINCIPLES OF BURDEN SHARING AND CONSIDER
HOW THEY WILL DEVELOP A MULTILATERAL PROGRAM TO COMPENSATE
FOR THE ADDITIONAL BURDEN ON THE US OCCASIONED BY THE STATIONING
OF OUR TROOPS IN EUROPE.

THERE IS ANOTHER ASPECT OF BURDEN SHARING THAT I
SHOULD CALL TO YOUR ATTENTION. SPAIN, AS YOU
KNOW, HAS BEEN WILLING TO MAKE MAJOR BASE AND
SUPPORTING FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO THE U. S. ON A
BILATERAL BASIS. THIS ARRANGEMENT, WHICH SUBSTANTIALLY
BENEFITS THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, CANNOT BE TAKEN FOR
GRANTED. INDEFINITE ACCESS TO SPAIN'S MILITARY FACILITIES IS
BECOMING INCREASINGLY DOUBTFUL. I
<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 15 APR 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 JUN 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973USNATO02831
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: USNATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730636/dccbkaai.tel
Line Count: 335
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: ONLY
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 15 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15-Aug-2001 by willialc>; APPROVED <19-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CORRECTED> gwr 19990503
Subject: RATIO OF FORCE DEPLOYED
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
HELSINKI
MADRID
Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005